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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Aggregate cattle stocks are a peculiar economic time series. To the best of my knowledge, no
other series displays such regular and lengthy economic cycles. The regularity of the cattle cycle,
as shown by the (detrended) total stock of cattle in the United States in Figure 1, is unmistakable
— spanning approximately ten years from peak to peak.1 This is not simply a U.S. phenomenon
either; similar cycles can be found in other countries such as Argentina and Uruguay (Mundlak
and Huang, 1996). The unique nature of the cattle cycle has led to a great deal of research
aimed at understanding cattle dynamics (e.g., Jarvis (1974); Rucker, Burt and LaFrance (1984);
Foster and Burt (1992); Rosen, Murphy and Scheinkman (1994); and Nerlove and Fornari (1998)).
However, despite all this research, no study has been able to replicate the cattle industry’s most
famous feature — the approximate ten-year cattle cycle — within a model that is consistent with
microeconomic fundamentals. This paper attempts to ﬁll that void.
Cattle cycles present an intriguing economic puzzle. Exactly what is the mechanism that causes
cattle producers to collectively take actions that create such a regular cycle? And why is it spread
out over such long time horizons? The standard story is summed up well by DeGraﬀ (1960):
A number of circumstances might trigger the swings of a cattle cycle....While such
inﬂuences as a change in demand or in feed supplies may initiate a cycle, they do
not explain the sequence of events which follow. The reason why a cycle follows its
standardized pattern is found, not in economics, but in biology.... The lifespan of cattle
is long. They reproduce and grow slowly. If a beef heifer is kept for breeding instead
of being sent to slaughter, her ﬁrst calf does not reach the market until nearly three
years later. This is indeed a long delay in economic response. To say that cycles in
cattle originate largely within the industry itself is not to say that producers are either
ignorant or indiﬀerent to the consequences of their decisions. The slow-moving biology
of the species is the factor that extends the period between decision and consequence
and leads to the patterned nature of the cattle cycle.
The leading formal analysis of cattle cycles appears to be that by Rosen, Murphy and Scheinkman
1Historical (1930-1999) data on cattle stocks are detrended using an approximate band-pass ﬁlter that is designed
to isolate cycles with periodicity between ﬁve and 15 years (Baxter and King, 1999).
2(1994), RMS hereafter. Their article was a major contribution to the research on cattle cycles.2
They formalized the concepts in the above quotation by showing that regular cycles in cattle stocks
are consistent with rational, proﬁt-maximizing ranchers. Based in part on their work, it now
appears to be fairly well accepted that the cattle cycle is the result of producers’ responses to
exogenous shocks in their environment, coupled with lengthy biological and maturation lags. The
problem with their explanation, however, is that it fails to produce the deﬁning feature of cattle
stocks — the approximate ten-year cycle. Rather, they produce cycles with periods somewhere in
the neighborhood of three to four years. In fact, in their conclusion RMS state that “some longer
[approximate ten-year] cycles in consumption and stocks not explained by this model are found in
the data.”
To address this shortcoming, I make two substantial changes to the RMS environment. First,
and most importantly, I explicitly model the age distribution of the breeding stock.3 RMS assume
that the cows die out exponentially. In reality, breeding cows have a ﬁnite productive life that
begins to deteriorate somewhere in the neighborhood of ten years (Jarvis, 1974; Trapp, 1986). The
fact that cattle cycles are also approximately ten years in length is no coincidence. Second, in
response to recent research questioning the validity of full rational expectations in the cattle industry
(Nerlove and Fornari, 1998; Baak, 1999; and Chavas, 2000), I allow a certain fraction of ranchers
to have boundedly rational expectations, in the sense that they form expectations of future prices
based on only past information. Although these ranchers do not have fully rational expectations,
it is important to recognize that this does not mean they are necessarily acting contrary to their
own best interest. Rather, some ranchers may simply face higher costs associated with obtaining
or processing the necessary information. The remaining fraction of ranchers are assumed to be
forward-looking and fully rational. Coupled with the age distribution, the presence of boundedly
rational producers improves the model’s ability to propagate shocks to produce regular ten-year
cycles.
2Early research attempting to understand cycles in agriculture typically relied on the cobweb theorem (Ezekiel,
1938), or more generally on a Nerlovian supply speciﬁcation (Nerlove, 1958). Although the cattle industry is faced
with production lags as required by the cobweb model, it has never been successfully applied to the issue of cattle
cycles largely because of the unrealistically long production periods necessary to generate the observed cycles (Muth,
1961).
3Other authors have modeled the age distribution of animal herds (e.g., Jarvis, 1982; Trapp, 1986; Chavas and
Klemme, 1986; and Foster and Burt, 1992), however none have done so within a model of individual optimizing
behavior intended to explain cattle cycles.
3As a ﬁnal introductory note, cattle are not the only industry where cyclical behavior can po-
tentially be explained by careful treatment of the age distribution of capital. Naturally, other
agricultural industries such as hogs, horses or various crops where biological lags between invest-
ment and ﬁnal production tend to stretch out economic responses may, in particular, beneﬁtf r o m
careful accounting of the age distribution of capital. However, non-agricultural industries where
capital has a well-deﬁned ﬁnite lifetime may also be candidates. For example, consider an increase
in the aggregate demand for higher education (such as that occurring during the U.S.’s involvement
in the Viet Nam war in the mid-late 1960s and early 1970s).4 This increase in the demand for
higher education will likely generate a lagged increase in new Ph.D.’s. Over time, these new Ph.D.’s
will age and approach the end of their working life. As they retire, a new inﬂux of Ph.D.’s will be
necessary to meet the demand for their services, who in turn will also tend to retire together. This
ebb and ﬂow of new Ph.D.’s, acting in response to demand and supply shocks, is likely to generate
a predictable cycle in higher education. Models that treat (human, biological or physical) capital
as depreciating exponentially, as opposed to tracking its entire age distribution, are unlikely to be
as eﬀective in explaining the timing and magnitude of economic cycles.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some descriptive facts regarding the U.S.
cattle industry and introduces the data. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and highlights
some of its implications using impulse response functions. Section 4 presents an attempt to ﬁt
the U.S. cycle in cattle stocks using the theoretical model and major economic disturbances that
have occurred over the last 70 years. Finally, section 5 concludes by summarizing the paper’s most
important ﬁndings.
2 Cattle Facts and Data
2.1 A Brief Description of the Cow-Calf Operation
Since the details of the cattle industry are not universally understood, I will brieﬂy outline the
environment that is being modeled. In Western and Midwestern states, beef calves are typically
4Historical college enrollment data are available at the U.S. Census Bureau’s website
(http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/school.html).
4born in the spring.5 In the ﬁrst six months of the calf’s life, ranchers face few management options.
If the calf is male, it is likely to be castrated. Because a mature bull can breed up to 50 cows, the
number of males that need to be retained for breeding is small. Calves are then weaned from their
mothers in the fall, at which time, they are approximately six months old. At this point, ranchers
face an important management decision for female calves since females are both a consumption and
a capital good. Producers decide whether to retain the female calf for addition to the breeding
stock (capital good) or send them to slaughter (consumption good). The decision for weaned steers
is simpler as they are only a consumption good and are consequently destined for slaughter.
Weaned calves that are sent to slaughter do not go there immediately. Most will go through a
process of backgrounding and ﬁnishing. Backgrounding typically involves a four to six month period
when a weaned calf is maintained on pasture or harvested forage before entering the feedlot. Once
this stage is complete, the animal is transferred to a feedlot and begins the process of ﬁnishing,
where it will be fed high-concentrate grains for another four to six months to be fattened for
slaughter. The ﬁnishing of young animals is a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to the 1930s,
feeding of high-concentrate grains was atypical. Since then, the practice of ﬁnishing young animals
with grains has become increasingly more common, and in more recent times (beginning in the
1960s), the ﬁnishing has been completed primarily in organized feedlots.
Heifers that are not sold after weaning typically become part of the producer’s breeding stock.
Breeding cows can produce at most a single calf per year, have a gestation period of nine months,
and can be bred for the ﬁrst time when they are approximately 15 months old. A breeding cow may
then be retained and bred in subsequent years until approximately her tenth year. At this point,
her reproductive abilities begin to deteriorate . C o w sm a yb ec u l l e da ta n ya g ea n da r et y p i c a l l y
culled after pregnancy testing in the fall when the calves are sold. The culled cows will go directly
to slaughter as their beef is of lower grade and is not suitable for ﬁnishing.
5The timing of the cattle operations in regions other than the West and Midwest vary, although the basic economic
problem for the ranchers is the same. For instance, in the South, a substantial number of the cattle operators calve
in November and December rather than in the spring. However, for the US as a whole, the majority of the cattle
operations follow the seasonal timing used in the West and Midwest (Gilliam, 1984).
52.2 The Data
The primary source for data on the cattle industry is Agricultural Statistics, an annual publication
of the United States Department of Agriculture. The cattle data in Agricultural Statistics are
impressive in their detail and coverage (e.g., the total stock of cattle dates back to 1867). However,
there are important limitations of the data as well. First, at various times during the twentieth
century, there were abrupt changes both in the accounting procedures (e.g., move from an age-based
to a weight-based accounting system in 1972) and structure of the industry (e.g., ﬁnishing did not
become signiﬁcant until the 1930’s). Second, several key series are not recorded prior to 1930 and
many of those that are recorded prior to 1930 are heavily aggregated across diﬀerent classiﬁcations
of animals. In response to these limitations, I begin the sample period in 1930 and focus attention
exclusively on three types of female animals: calves, heifers and adult cows. These three series
are given, respectively, by (1) a proportion of the total annual beef calf crop, (2) the total January
1 stock of beef heifers that have not calved, and (3) the total January 1 stock of cows and heifers
that have calved.6
3 Theoretical Model
The theoretical model is set in discrete time with decision intervals one year in length. It is assumed
that once a year, cow-calf operators make decisions regarding how many heifer calves to retain and
adult cows to cull. This is a departure from RMS, who assume that only two-year old adult
animals are culled from the stock. Allowing ranchers to make decisions on both the cow and calf
margins reﬂects the trend over the better part of the twentieth century to feed young animals high
concentrate grains prior to slaughtering. In essence, this modiﬁcation reﬂects the reality that there
are actually two separate markets for beef — one associated with higher quality fed meat (such as
steaks and roasts) and one associated with lower quality non-fed meat products (such as hamburger
and canned meat). Furthermore, I minimize the role that males play in the model. All males
are destined to become either steers (castrated males), which subsequently go through a one-year
6The USDA does not report separate series for dairy and beef calf crops. To eliminate dairy calves, I subtract
the projected number of dairy calves from the total calf crop. To estimate the number of dairy calves, I multiply the
total calving rate for beef and dairy calves by the number of dairy cows. These estimates are comparable to the ones
presented in DeGraﬀ (1960). None of the qualitative results that follow appear to be sensitive to this procedure.
6ﬁnishing process or are kept as bulls for breeding purposes. Operators are assumed to maximize a
discounted expected future stream of proﬁts subject to biological and market constraints. Other
than the manner in which they form expectations, all operators are assumed identical and make
decisions in competitive input and output markets.
3.1 Biological Constraints
In this section, the laws governing stock dynamics are modeled. Each cohort of females is described
in a recursive manner by the following law of motion:
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t is the total stock of females of age j on the farm at time t, δj is the natural death rate
for a female of age j, α
(j)
t is the cull rate (i.e., fraction of the stock sent to market) for females of
age j at time t, j =0 ,...,m,a n dm denotes the ﬁnal year of productive ability for females. Two




t =1 . That is, all yearling heifers (females
of age j =1 ) move “through the pipeline” on their way to the breeding stock and all adult females
of age m are culled from the stock because they are unable to produce calves once they are older
than age m.
To better understand equation 1, consider the stock of retained yearling heifers at time t +1 ,
k
(1)
t+1, which is equal to the number of heifer calves in period t which did not die or get sent
to market. Once a female calf becomes a yearling heifer, her fate for the next year is entirely
predetermined (recall that α
(1)
t =0 , ∀t). If she was culled from the calf stock, she then enters
the ﬁnishing process for the next period on her way to slaughter. If she was retained for addition
to the breeding stock, she will enter the breeding stock at age two and will remain there until she
either dies (with probability δj) or is culled from the stock (α
(j)
t ). The entire breeding stock at
time t (bt) is then measured as the aggregate of all females of age j =2 ,...,m:
bt = k
(2)
t + ... + k
(m)
t .( 2 )
Net investment into (or out of) the stock of breeding cows comes in three forms — retained yearling
heifers, culled adult cows, or the death of adult cows.
7To close the recursive structure for female stock dynamics, let the number of females calves
be proportional to the breeding stock in the previous period. The factor of proportionality is
0.5θ, where 0.5 indicates that half the calves born in each period are female and θ is the successful
birthing rate. Therefore, the stock of female calves evolves according to
k
(0)
t =0 .5θbt−1.( 3 )
3.2 Markets
I begin by assuming a competitive input market where each individual producer takes the price of
inputs as given. While there are numerous operating expenses for a cattle producer, the cost of
feed makes up nearly two-thirds of input costs (Gilliam, 1984). Since calves require little feed in
their ﬁrst year, it is assumed that calves are costless to maintain. Per animal costs are represented
by the term wt. Similar to RMS, the unit cost function for the industry is assumed to follow a
ﬁrst-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process
wt = ψ0 + ϕ1wt−1 +  w,t (4)
where εw,t v iid(0,σ2
w).
After a rancher sells his animal and the animal completes the ﬁnishing process, it is typically
purchased by a packing plant, slaughtered, and then processed for retail sale. Each of these steps
adds value to the ﬁnal product. To capture the added value, I specify the following linear markup
equations that relate the live cattle price to the retail price of beef (Jarvis, 1974):
p
(0)
t = φ0Etrpf,t+1 (5)
p
(j)
t = φjrpnf,t (6)
where p
(j)
t i st h el i v ep r i c ef o ra na n i m a lo fa g ej, rpf,t is retail price of fed beef, rpnf,t is retail price
of non-fed beef, Et is the expectation operator conditional on all information dated t and earlier,
and φj is the markup parameter for animal of age j. Equation (5) states that the price a rancher
receives for his calves in period t, p
(0)
t , is proportional to the conditional expectation of the retail
price he will receive for his ﬁnished beef one period hence, Etrpf,t+1. Since adult cows do not go
8through the ﬁnishing process, (6) is a contemporaneous markup equation, such that the live price
of cows is simply proportional to retail price of non-fed beef in the same period.
Following RMS, I assume that the demand for retail beef is (log) linear and depends upon its
own price and an unobserved stochastic term. Inverse demand for retail beef is given by
rpf,t = λ0(cf,t)λ1 exp(νf,t) (7)
rpnf,t = π0(cnf,t)π1 exp(νnf,t) (8)
where νf,t and νnf,t follow mean-zero AR(1) processes with autocorrelation parameters ρf and ρnf











t (1 − δj)k
(j)
t . (10)
In other words, total consumption of fed beef at time t, cf,t, is given by a proportion of the total
number of calves that were sent to market in period t − 1, and total consumption of non-fed beef,
cnf,t,i sg i v e nb yap r o p o r t i o no ft h et o t a ln u m b e ro fc o w ss e n tt os l a u g h t e ri np e r i o dt.
3.3 The Rancher’s Problem
All ranchers are assumed to maximize the discounted value of their operation over an inﬁnite
horizon subject to (1) - (10) and the initial stocks, k
(j)






























to maximize (11) subject to
the relevant constraints.

































Recall that there is no ﬁrst-order condition associated with j =1because α
(1)
t =0by assumption.
The intuition behind (12) and (13) is clear. Proﬁt maximization requires that the returns from
either culling or retaining an animal are equivalent at the margin. Equation 12 states that the
market value of a female calf must equal the discounted, expected net value when she becomes a cow
two periods hence plus the discounted, expected value of her calf three periods hence. Equation
(13) states that the market value of an adult female in the current period must equal the expected
discounted net market value of the same animal in the next period plus the expected discounted
market value of her calf two periods hence. Notice also that by iterating (13) m periods into the
future, using the law of iterated expectations and some simple algebra, we can express the present













































This expression states that the value of a female calf in this period must be equal to her discounted
expected salvage value as a cow m periods in the future (term #1) less the discounted expected
holding costs (term #2) plus the discounted expected future value of the stream of calves she will
produce over her eﬀective lifetime (term #3). Equation (14) highlights the intertemporal nature
of the supply decision in the cattle industry. A female animal has a dual value — she is valued
both as a consumable product today and simultaneously as a calf-making machine over her eﬀective
lifetime.
103.4 Expectations
Recent research has questioned the appropriateness of full rational expectations in the cattle in-
dustry (Nerlove and Fornari, 1998; Baak, 1999; and Chavas 2000). Nerlove and Fornari advocate
using quasi-rational expectations, which amounts to forming expectations of future variables with
a best-ﬁtting time series model. Baak estimates that approximately one third of the cattle market
participants are boundedly rational in the sense that they do not, or are unable to, exploit all
available information to generate expectations of future variables. Similarly, Chavas argues that
beef producers display behavior consistent with heterogeneous expectations.
In response to this recent research, I allow for two types of ranchers. The ﬁrst type is fully
rational. They treat expected future variables as endogenous and produce forecasts from the
economic system such that the forecast errors will not be systematically related to any information
known at the time the expectations are formed. The second type is boundedly rational and
form naive (Etxt+s = xt,s>0) expectations of future operating costs, calf prices and cow
prices. The existence of this second type of rancher is supported by Chavas (2000) who estimates
that a substantial number of cattle market participants behave in a manner consistent with naive
expectations. In all other ways, the boundedly rational producer is treated as fully rational. The
presence of boundedly rational ranchers suggests that it is too costly (in terms of either obtaining or
processing the necessary information) for them to form the fully rational forecast. In the impulse
response functions to follow, the fraction of ranchers that are fully rational (γ) are set at γ =1 .00
and γ =0 .67, the same values used in Baak (1999).7
3.5 Equilibrium and Solution Technique
An equilibrium for this problem is a sequence of prices, cull rates, and stocks which solve each type
of rancher’s problem and clear the respective markets in each period. The system of equations to be
solved is (1) - (10), an aggregate version of the Euler equations (12) and (13), as well as the initial
values k
(j)
0 for j =0 ,...,m. This is a third-order system of nonlinear diﬀerence equations. To solve
the model, I ﬁrst calibrate the model, calculate the steady-state values for the variables, linearize the
equations around the stationary steady state, write the variables in terms of percentage deviations
7It should be noted that the model becomes nonstationary for parameterizations in the neighborhood of γ ≤ 0.5.
This type of behavior is also described in Baak (1999).
11from their respective steady-state values, and solve for the equilibrium paths of the variables using
a method developed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and modiﬁed by Farmer (1999).
3.6 Calibration
Before discussing the calibration, it is necessary to address the relationship between culling decisions
and the age of the cow. Given a homogenous breeding stock and a retail demand for non-fed beef
that is independent of the age of the cow, ranchers are likely to cull the oldest cows ﬁrst. As a
result, the equilibrium path for cull rates will involve a critical age τt (possibly varying over time)
at which cows would have equal consumption and capital values. All cows younger than τt will
be retained and cows older than τt will be culled (Jarvis, 1974). Allowing for a time-varying
critical slaughter age would greatly complicate the analysis. As RMS (page 471) state, “making
the slaughter age endogenous ... has proved too diﬃcult to analyze and is omitted.” Following
RMS, I ﬁx the critical slaughter age for cows, but rather than set the slaughter age at two as in
RMS, I set it equal to nine (i.e., τt =9 ). An average slaughter age of nine is consistent with the
evidence presented in Trapp (1986).
To facilitate comparison with RMS, I attempt to match their parameter values. I begin by
setting the productive lifespan of a cow equal to ten years (m =1 0 ), the baseline value mentioned
in RMS. The discount factor and birth rate parameters are set at β =0 .909 and θ =0 .85.A s
in RMS, the death rate parameters of young animals are set at δ0 = δ1 =0while the death rate
parameters for the breeding stock are set at δ2 = ... = δ10 =0and δ11 =1 , implying an average
natural death rate for the breeding stock in the neighborhood of 0.1. Lastly, the persistence
parameters for the demand and cost shocks are set equal to 0.6 as in RMS (ρj = ψ1 =0 .6)f o r
j =0 ,...,m.8
As for the price elasticities, there is a wealth of empirical information on retail market responses
for fed and non-fed beef (e.g., Wohlgenant (1989), Smallwood, Haidacher and Blaylock (1989), and
Capps et al. (1994)).9 Although, the reported elasticities vary from study to study depending
8There is also some empirical support for RMS’ assumption that the autoregressive parameters equal 0.6.U n i -
variate ﬁrst-order autoregressive estimates for the sample period 1930 through 1999 using the real price of calves,
cows and feed index are 0.587, 0.565 and 0.591 respectively.
9Since the retail demand functions are in their inverse forms with price as the dependent variable, the λ’s and π’s
are often labeled as own-price ﬂexibilities rather than elasticities. I continue to use the term elasticities rather than
ﬂexibilities, but the inverse form of the demand functions needs to be kept in mind.
12on diﬀerences in the sample period, data employed, functional forms, control factors, etc., most
studies estimate that beef is inelastic with respect to its own price. The approximate midpoint
estimates for the own-price elasticity of demand from these studies is −0.5 (i.e., λ1 = π1 = −2),
which are the values used in this study.
Unfortunately, I am unaware of any empirical evidence for the markup parameters φ0 and φj,
j =0 ,...,m. This is largely due to the lack of reliable historical information on the retail prices
for fed and non-fed beef. Mathews et al. (1999), however, provide recent (1970-1997) time series
evidence on the spread between farm-level and retail-level beef for a weighted average of both
choice beef and hamburger. The spread between the two has been growing in recent times (a trend
that has prompted a large amount of literature regarding the competitiveness of the beef-packing
industry). For simplicity, I abstract from the apparent time-varying nature of this parameter and
assume there is a single common markup parameter, which averages approximately 0.6 over this
period.
Given the calibrated parameter values above, Table 1 displays the implied steady-state val-
ues for a select set of variables (asterisks denote imposed values). Since there is no diﬀer-
ence between boundedly rational and fully rational ranchers in the steady state, only one set
of stock, slaughter and cull rates are reported. Notice that although calf prices per pound have
historically been approximately twice that of cull cows, cull cows weigh about twice as much
as calves. Therefore, their gross values are approximately equal and imposing equal steady-
state, farm-level prices per head for calves and cows seems justiﬁed (see also RMS, footnote 2).
Table 1. Select Steady-State Values
Variables k(0) k(1) bc (0) c(9) c(10) α(0) α(9) p(0) p(9) w
Values 10.7 3.0 25.2 7.8 1.5 1.5 0.7 0.5* 0.6 0.6* 0.23
3.7 Impulse Response Functions
To highlight the dynamics of the model, begin by considering a ﬁve percent persistent (ρ =0 .6)
negative shock to the demand for retail non-fed beef.10 The responses of the cow stock, total female
10Choosing non-fed beef also facilitates later comparisons to RMS who do not explicitly model fed beef.
13stock, cow cull rate and calf cull rate are shown in Figure 2.11 The dashed lines are the responses
of these four variables within the model that incorporates the age distribution of the breeding stock
(m =1 0 ) and fully rational expectations (γ =1 ). This model is referred to as the ADRE model.
The optimal producer response for the t =2negative demand shock that temporarily increases
the relative price of calves to cows is to immediately send fewer cows and more calves to market.12
These culling decisions imply an increase in both the cow and total female stocks in period t =3
(recall that culled calves remain in the total female stock while they are being ﬁnished). The
cow and total female stock then return back toward their steady-state values, but the total female
stock returns more slowly because the additional t =3cows add to future total stocks by giving
b i r t ht oc a l v e si np e r i o dt =4 .A s t h e s e t =4calves age, they eventually approach the end of
their productive life. In order to compensate for this impending decrease in the breeding stock,
producers respond by sending fewer cows to market (i.e., the dip in the cow cull rate at t =1 2 ).
These new t =1 3cows and their t =1 4calves generate an “echo eﬀect” exactly m =1 0periods
after the initial peak in the cow and total female stock. Similarly, an even smaller third peak
(barely visible in Figure 2) appears m =1 0periods after the second peak, and so on and so forth.
Thus, the ADRE model endogenously generates cycles in cattle stocks with a period of ten years.
One shortcoming of the ADRE model is that subsequent peaks in stocks are substantially
smaller than the initial peak. Subsequent peaks are dampened because forward-looking producers
anticipate the certain decline in the breeding stock ten years hence and take actions to mitigate
future cyclical variation. To address this problem, now let a positive fraction of ranchers form
expectations in a backward-looking manner. I refer to this model with the age distribution of the
breeding stock (m =1 0 ) and boundedly rational expectations (γ =0 .67) as the ADBR model. The
dynamic responses for the ADBR model are depicted by the solid lines in Figure 2. The primary
consequence of moving from fully rational expectations to a boundedly-rational expectation scheme
is to magnify the secondary cycles. The average producer now responds more vigorously along the
calf margin because a fraction (1 − γ) of producers are not forward-looking enough to anticipate
the impact that retaining fewer heifers will have on subsequent breeding stocks. As a result,
11A single, aggregate cow cull rate is created by taking the ratio of total non-fed beef consumption to the stock of
breeding cows.
12In contrast to Rosen (1987), this positive supply response holds even for permanent shocks that alter the relative
price of calves to cows (Aadland and Bailey, 2001). The important distinction between Rosen (1987) and the ADRE
model, in this regards, is that the latter separates the markets for fed and non-fed beef.
14the breeding stock will fall below its steady-state path and require a larger investment when then
progeny of the additional t =3breeding cows eventually die oﬀ.T h i s e ﬀect illustrates the well-
known idea that rational expectations models tend to have weaker propagation methods than do
boundedly rational models and hence assign more of the volatility to exogenous shocks rather than
endogenous responses (Cogley and Nason, 1995 and Baak, 1999).
Finally, I contrast the dynamics of the ADBR model with those from the RMS model. The
RMS model diﬀers from the ADBR model in four ways: (1) all expectations are rational (γ =1 );
(2) no calves are culled from the stock (α
(0)
t =0 ); (3) there is no retail-farm markup (φ =1 ); and
(4) cows that enter the breeding stock become ageless and subsequently die oﬀ at an exponential
rate. Figure 3 reproduces the dynamics of the ADBR model and superimposes the IRFs for
the RMS model (essentially the mirror images of those in Figure 4b, page 478 of RMS). The
most noticeable diﬀerence between the dynamics of the ADBR and RMS models is that the RMS
model does not endogenously generate cycles in the total stock (although it does produce much
shorter cycles in the breeding stock — approximately three to four years from peak to peak). The
diﬀerences between the ADBR and RMS IRFs are primarily due to the diﬀerential treatment of
the age distribution of the breeding stock, which is the key ingredient in generating ten-year cycles
in cattle stocks. Moreover, when a careful accounting of the age distribution of the capital stock
is coupled with boundedly rational agents, the model’s ability to propagate demand and supply
shocks is substantially improved.
4 Explaining the Periodicity of the U.S. Cattle Cycle
The primary motivation for this research is to build a theoretic model, consistent with producer
behavior, which is capable of generating cycles in cattle stocks similar to those observed in the
United States. Surprisingly, to the best of my knowledge, there is no existing model which is
capable of endogenously generating cattle cycles similar to those in the U.S. without resorting to
ad hoc dynamics. Mundlak and Huang (1996, p. 855) state that “there is no empirical model
that fully captures the role that it [technology] plays in determining the dynamics of the sector
and that can reproduce the cyclicity observed in the data. This is not for lack of trying but due
to the complexity of the problem.” RMS come the closest. However, their apparent excellent ﬁt
to the U.S. cattle cycle is somewhat overstated. RMS document the close ﬁt by contrasting the
15coeﬃcients from an empirical ARMA model to the coeﬃcients from a theoretic model of the same
order. However, as Nerlove and Fornari (1998, p. 142) state, “...many diﬀerent ARMA models
are consistent with the basic data (not identiﬁed by the ﬁnal-form solutions) so that comparison
of the estimated coeﬃcients with theoretical benchmarks for the same orders of processes reveals
little.” Moreover, the graphs in Figure 6b of RMS are generated by feeding in the reduced-form
ARMA residuals from the U.S. data into the theoretical ARMA process of the same order. Given
that the theoretical ARMA process for stocks in RMS do not display long cycles, the excellent ﬁt
is essentially an application of the Slutsky (1937) eﬀect.13 A more compelling comparison would
involve the structural disturbances and the restrictions imposed by theory on the reduced-form
disturbances.
The standard method for evaluating stochastic general equilibrium models is to calibrate the
model by choosing reasonable parameter values, then replace the structural disturbances with
random draws from a distribution (typically Gaussian), simulate artiﬁcial data by feeding the
realized disturbances into the equations describing the equilibrium time path, and then contrast
various statistical properties of the artiﬁcial and actual data. The problem with this methodology,
within the context of cattle cycles, is that draws from a Gaussian distribution will not generate
approximate ten-year cycles in the any of the current structural cattle-cycle models. Once the
wheels of the cattle cycle get set in motion by producers’ response to the exogenous shock, another
shock of similar magnitude is likely to be drawn, blurring the lengthy cyclical responses.
Instead, I argue that the exogenous shocks to the cattle industry have not been Gaussian.
Rather, over the last 70 years, my interpretation of the historical literature is that the cattle
industry has been disproportionately inﬂuenced by four transient macroeconomic shocks. Of
course, there have been other major changes in the cattle industry over the last 70 years (e.g.,
ﬁnishing on organized feedlots, advances in cattle breeding practices and genetics, increased beef-
packer concentration, etc.). However, these are generally more gradual, structural phenomena
that act primarily on the steady-state cattle stock rather than cyclical deviations about this steady
state. Since this research is focused on cattle cycles and not secular trends, I do not attempt to
model the trends and accordingly remove them from the U.S. data by passing the data through an
approximate band-pass ﬁlter.
13Conﬁrmed via personal correspondence with one of the authors.
164.1 Four Macroeconomic Episodes
The four big macroeconomic episodes during the past 70 years were: (1) the Great Depression; (2)
World War II; (3) the OPEC oil price shock of 1973 and the subsequent 1974-75 recession; and (4)
the OPEC oil price shock of 1979 and the subsequent 1981-82 recession. Below I present descriptive
evidence to support the hypothesis that these shocks, as well as some simultaneous droughts, had
a disproportionately large impact on the cattle industry and provided the impetus for subsequent
cattle cycles. Schlebecker (1963) writes “Clearly, depression and prosperity originated in causes
far removed from anything that happened on the Plains. And yet nothing is so clear as the eﬀects
of the business cycles on the aﬀairs of the cattlemen.”
4.1.1 Great Depression
First was the Great Depression — the largest economic downturn in modern U.S. history. The ﬁrst
signs of a downturn began in 1929 after the stock market crash in October. Real GDP fell for
the next four years and although real GDP began to rise again in 1934, unemployment was still at
22%. The Great Depression had severe eﬀects on the cattle industry, as in almost all economic
sectors. The low point for the cattle industry appeared to be 1933. The U.S. unemployment rate
was at 24.5% and four years of declining national income meant many consumers could no longer
aﬀord to eat beef. To make matters worse, several cattle-producing states faced terrible drought
conditions. As Schlebecker (1963) writes
In 1933, each American ate an average of 58.6 pounds of beef and veal. Americans
would have eaten even less if the federal government had not furnished beef for people
on relief. Cattle prices fell to unbelievably low levels...as much as 25 per cent below
the already low levels of 1932. As 1933 began, many cattlemen had already become
insolvent, and most of them produced cattle at a loss.
Skaggs (1986) continues regarding conditions in 1933
Compounding the disaster was a devastating drouth that not only seared the grassy
plains but also hurt the usually well-watered Missouri, Mississippi and Ohio valleys.
L i v e s t o c kr a i s e r sa n df e e d e rs alike dumped cattle on an already glutted market, and
prices tumbled ... to reach a new twentieth-century low.
17As shown in Figure 1, cattle numbers were increasing during the early periods of the Great
Depression — 1930 through 1934. After 1934, cattle numbers started to decline, not so much due to
contemporaneous economic factors, but an accumulation of years of low prices and adverse weather
that placed ranchers in a position of ﬁnancial hardship.
4.1.2 World War II
The United States’ involvement in World War II spanned the period 1941 to 1946. Higher personal
incomes and higher government demand for beef, coupled with price controls that began in 1942
led to a shortage of beef that was felt most acutely beginning in late 1942 (Schlebecker, 1963). In
response, the Oﬃce of Price Administration began rationing meat in 1943, which continued through
late 1945 (Sims, 1951). Under normal market conditions, such a strong, temporary demand for
beef would have provided an incentive to cull more animals to take advantages of higher prices.
However, in an environment of price ceilings and frequently changing government policies, cattle
producers held onto animals in the face of substantial uncertainty about expected future prices.
Schlebecker (1963) writes that
Unquestionably, cattlemen and others intentionally created meat shortages before
controls ended. Producers held their cattle oﬀ the market as they waited for the end of
controls; when controls did cease, they expected prices to shoot up. They were right,
and they did not have to wait long. In October, 1946, all meat controls ended, and
prices immediately rose. Stimulated by price incentives, producers sold all they could,
but they could not market enough beef to satisfy consumers. The postwar inﬂation
had begun.
William Arant (1946) adds
...the oﬃcial belief throughout the war was that producers were missing the bus by
failing to liquidate their herds when demand for meat was high. The Department of
Agriculture repeatedly urged greater cattle marketings... The holding back of cattle
was in part a result of the uncertainty surrounding the government programs. It has
been the experience rather consistently under controls that the man who held on a little
18longer secured a higher price. Also, in many cases, income taxes could be reduced by
postponing the realization of proﬁts until the next taxable year.
At the same time, the Southwest and especially Texas was experiencing a major drought.
Schlebecker (1963) writes about the drought:
The southwestern drouth grew worse in 1943. Texas reported the worst weather
since 1917. Large parts of Texas, Kansas and Oklahoma were declared disaster areas.
The War Food Administration sent in quantities of soybeans and hay to rescue the
stricken ranchers.
4.1.3 OPEC Oil Shock I and the 1974-75 Recession
In late 1973, the OPEC oil cartel drastically reduced its production of crude oil and imposed an oil
embargo on the United States. This sudden adverse supply-side shock sent the price of oil in the
U.S. up by nearly 70% between 1973 and 1974 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). Higher oil prices
led to substantially higher operating costs for ﬁrms across many diﬀerent sectors, and subsequently,
the U.S. economy fell into recession in 1974 and 1975 (Hamilton, 1983). As a result of a relatively
energy-intensive feed-crop sector (Hanson, Robinson and Schluter, 1993), a sharp increase in grain
exports due to a depreciated dollar and a drought, the price of feedstuﬀ increased drastically in 1974
(Beale et al., 1983). Exacerbating the problem, the Nixon administration imposed a freeze on the
retail price of beef in 1973. Feedlot operators reduced their demand for cattle, and when coupled
with an economy-wide recession, this led to a sharp decrease in the demand for beef and the derived
demand for cattle (Rucker, Burt and LaFrance, 1984). Consequently, cattle producers postponed
sending animals to market and aggregate cattle stocks rose sharply, reaching their highest level of
the twentieth century in 1975 (Martin and Haack, 1977).
4.1.4 OPEC Oil Shock II and the 1981-82 Recession
In 1979, only ﬁve years after the ﬁrst oil price shock, OPEC once again cut back drastically on oil
production. U.S. inﬂation returned to double-digit levels and the economy fell to recession again in
late 1981 and 1982. The recession and abundant supplies of competing meats reduced consumers’
demand for beef (Beale et al., 1983). At the time of the price shock, aggregate cattle numbers
19were at the bottom of the downside of a cycle initiated by the increased retention from the 1974-75
recession. Cattle numbers then started increasing again with the onset of the 1979 oil price shock
and the subsequent recession, reaching their peak again in 1982. The timing of the oil shock and
recession led to the shortest cattle cycle over the last 70 years — seven years from its 1975 peak to
its 1982 peak.14
4.2 Simulation Results
The four major shocks outlined above provide a natural experiment to test the theoretical cattle
model. Certainly, there were other smaller macroeconomic and industry-speciﬁc shocks that in-
ﬂuenced producers’ incentives. The advantage, however, of focusing on these four disturbances
is that their macroeconomic impacts and timing are well recognized and they can be treated as
exogenous to the cattle industry. In fact DeGraﬀ (1960) notes:
Some of the inﬂuences that bring on the cyclical ﬂuctuations in cattle numbers
and prices arise entirely outside the cattle industry. When the nation encounters the
upheavals of war followed by a return to peace-time markets, or the disruption of a
great depression or a great drought, there is impact on the cattle industry which no one
can avoid. These are situations beyond the control of the cattlemen.
To highlight the eﬀects of these four episodes, I simulate artiﬁcial data from the ADBR model
using shocks from only these four time periods. This events-based approach to shock identiﬁcation
and model evaluation is similar in spirit to Romer and Romer (1989) and Ramey and Shapiro
(1998). Artiﬁcial data on cattle stocks are simulated by feeding in four adverse beef (fed and
non-fed) demand and operating cost shocks at time periods 1933, 1943, 1974 and 1981.15 The
14At the same time, a second negative demand shock hit the cattle industry (Purcell, 1990 and Chavas, 1983).
Consumers became increasingly concerned about high cholosterol diets associated with red meat. Purcell writes
that “consumer-level ... decreases in demand are hypothesized to be the single most important causal factor in the
structural changes of the 1980s.” However, the evidence appears to support a fairly gradual decline beginning in the
late 1970s and extending through to approximately 1987. No attempt is made here to distinguish the eﬀects of the
1981-82 recession-driven decline in the demand for beef with the decline associated with health concerns.
15Unlike the Great Depression and the 1974/1981 recessions, World War II led to an increase in the demand for
beef. At a ﬁrst glance, it would therefore seem more appropriate to simulate data using a positive shock to the
demand for beef during World War II. However, cattle and beef markets were not in equilibrium during the war
due to price controls. The equilibrium models discussed here, as a result, are incapable of accurately describing
the nature of prices and quantities during this time period. Rather than abandon the equilibrium model, I model
World War II as resulting in a decline in the demand for beef, which is observationally equivalent (with respect to
20magnitudes of these shocks are diﬃcult to identify either empirically or based on historical accounts.
Therefore, I choose the magnitudes of the shock using an informal grid search in order to minimize
the sum of squared deviations of (detrended) simulated and U.S. female cattle stocks over the
period 1930 through 1999. To keep this minimization problem tractable, it is completed subject
to the restrictions that (1) the shocks to fed and non-fed beef are equal in magnitude and (2)
in accordance with the historical evidence, the demand shocks are negative and the costs shocks
are positive. Finally, as in RMS, the shocks are transitory but persistent with autocorrelation
coeﬃcients for demand and costs set equal to 0.6. The exact timing of these disturbances and
their impact on the cattle industry is somewhat open to debate. I choose 1933 because it was
the trough of the Great Depression; 1974 and 1981 mark the beginning of the other two major
postwar economic downturns (NBER, 2001); and 1943 marked the beginning of meat rationing
during World War II.
The results of the simulation exercise are shown in the top panel of Figure 4. The solid line
depicts detrended U.S. female cattle stocks from 1930 through 1999, while the dashed line depicts
artiﬁcial stocks from the ADBR model. Vertical lines indicate the timing of the driving shocks.
The ADBR model, using only the four macro shocks described above, does a remarkable job of
matching the periodicity of the U.S. cattle cycle. The model misses some aspects of the cattle cycle
(i.e., tends to overstate the peakedness of the cycle and predicts a spurious echo eﬀect in 1983),
which is to be expected given the abstract nature of the model and the use of only four driving
shocks. However, overall the ﬁt is good with a simple correlation coeﬃcient between ADBR cattle
stocks and detrended U.S. cattle stocks equal to 0.53. Of particular interest is the fact that
the 1954 and 1964 peaks in U.S. cattle stocks are predicted by the ADBR model as endogenous
“echo eﬀects” that occur ten years or more after the driving shock. These echo eﬀects are caused
by producers’ responses to the changing age distribution of the breeding stock which result from
actions taken during the Great Depression and World War II.
Finally, consider the performance of the RMS model using the same four set of relative shocks.16
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the U.S. detrended female cattle stocks (solid line) and the
female stocks) to an increase in the demand for beef under price controls and substantial uncertainty regarding future
governmental regulations and controls. Recall that aggregate U.S. cattle stocks were increasing during the beginning
of World War II as producers held onto cattle in the midst of this uncertainty.
16Recall that RMS do not distinguish between fed and non-fed beef so there is but a single shock to the demand
for beef in each of the episodes.
21predicted response given by the RMS model (dashed line). The most notable feature of the
graphical comparison is that unlike the ADBR model, the RMS model is not capable of generating
ten-year cycles in stocks without the support of driving shocks approximately every ten years. In
fact, the contemporaneous correlation between the RMS and U.S. data is approximately zero, as
compared to 0.53 in the ADBR model. Even if one were to account for the apparent one-year
right-shift in the RMS simulations by beginning the impulses one year earlier (i.e., 1932, 1942, 1973
and 1980), the correlation is still only 0.18. The test statistic
(r13 − r23)
p
(T − 3)(1 + r12)
p




where rxy indicates the simple correlation coeﬃcients between the (1) ADBR, (2) RMS and (3)
U.S. data and T is the number of observations used to calculate the correlation, can be used to
test the hypothesis that the ADBR model provides a superior ﬁt (Weinberg and Goldberg, 1990).
The statistic above has a student t distribution with 5% critical value equal to 1.67. The realized
value of the test statistic (using the more optimistic RMS shock dates) equals 2.37 and leads to
a rejection of the null of equal correlations, indicating that the ADBR model provides a better
statistical ﬁt of the periodicity of the U.S. cattle cycle than the RMS model.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The most prominent feature of the cattle industry is the approximate ten-year cycle in stocks. Very
few economic time series display such regular cycles that stretch over such long periods of time.
The basic forces that drive cattle producers to act in such a way as to create the cattle cycle are
now fairly well understood. For example, Foster and Burt (1992, p.423) state
It would appear that the combination of price shocks and cycles along with the heifer-
replacement and cow-culling decisions, based on a changing age distribution within the
mature cow herd, all interacting with a neoclassical demand curve for beef, results in
the observed cattle cycle.
22Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, there does not exist any model of the cattle industry
which incorporates (1) exogenous price shocks, (2) investment decisions along both the heifer and
cow margins, (3) a changing age distribution of the mature cow herd, and (4) individual optimizing
behavior which is capable of endogenously generating approximate ten-year cycles in stocks. The
ADBR model presented in this paper makes progress in that direction. The model satisﬁes the four
conditions above and is capable of endogenously propagating structural disturbances to generate
ten-year cycles in cattle stocks. The ability of the model to generate ten-year cycles in cattle stocks
relies heavily on the realistic assumption that beef cows have a productive lifetime somewhere in the
neighborhood of ten years and that ranchers act in a manner consistent with a boundedly rational
expectations scheme.
An undesirable property of competing models of the cattle cycle is that since they are not
capable of endogenously generating ten-year cattle cycles, they require the unlikely scenario that
the economy experiences driving shocks approximately every ten years. To illustrate this point,
Is i m u l a t ea r t i ﬁcial data from the ADBR model, focusing exclusively on shocks from four major
macroeconomic episodes during the 1930-1999 period. These simulations demonstrate that the
ADBR model is capable of matching the periodicity of the U.S. cattle cycle without relying on
major shocks hitting the cattle industry every ten years.
The ADBR model appears to be a promising paradigm for understanding the nature of cattle
cycles. However, more research is necessary to fully understand the interesting phenomena of cattle
cycles. Important avenues for future research include more precise identiﬁcation of the structural
disturbances driving cattle cycles, further examination of price dynamics (including the implications
for countercyclical production strategies) and the relationship between trends and cycles.
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